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Foreword 
This paper has been produced under the umbrella of the DIE research project “Develop-
ment Policy: Questions for the Future,” for which funding from the German Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is gratefully acknowledged.  One com-
ponent of this project has been to assess research methods that can be applied to help an-
ticipate changes in the environment that development policy is designed to respond to. In 
an early stage of this project, studies written by Kosow / Gaßner (DIE Studies 39) and 
Lundsgaarde (DIE Studies 40) examined this general issue with reference to methods of 
futures and scenario analysis.  In this discussion paper, Sonja Grimm and Gerald Schnei-
der assess methods in the social sciences that can be used to predict social tipping points, 
characterised as abrupt shifts in social systems. They argue that the comparative utility of 
alternative approaches to prediction depends on factors such as the nature of data avail-
ability, the geographical scale of the analysis, and the forecasting time horizon. Apart 
from offering guidance on when these approaches to prediction are most relevant, the au-
thors use this analysis to point to ways that early warning can be improved in development 
policy planning. Beyond methodological considerations, they note that a key part of the 
challenge of improving early warning relates to how social scientific analysis can be better 
embedded in the policy setting, suggesting a need for continued reflection on institutional 
innovations to strengthen the linkage between research and policy choices.  
 
 
Erik Lundsgaarde Bonn, April 2011 
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Executive Summary 
The prediction of the breakdown of social order is both a considerable academic challenge 
and a major development concern. This essay argues that recent advances in the social 
sciences enable the policy community to meet these challenges. Against recurrent scepti-
cism, we argue that the prediction of political stability is a must and that the three main 
approaches used to assess these risks – the structural, the dynamic and the game-theoretic 
approaches – supplement each other in the task of predicting such extreme events like 
state failure. Our analysis particularly points out that: 
• the structural approach can be used for global risk assessments in which the risk to a 
country of experiencing a social tipping point is clearly identified;  
• the dynamic approach, which is used in various time series designs, may help the re-
search and development communities to identify possible phase shifts in which social 
interactions risk severe deterioration; and  
• the game-theoretic approach is able to predict some of the more irregular events and 
that some of the findings from the other approaches can be used for the implementa-
tion of this rather static approach. 
Although these approaches – alone or in conjunction with each other – can help us to iden-
tify some real risks, one of the key problems is the translation of these findings into rea-
sonable policy recommendations and the creation of a culture where policy makers evalu-
ate their priors based on systematic input from the social sciences. One particular chal-
lenge that the academic world and practitioners have to address is the forecasted effective-
ness of various policies that aim at reducing the risk of social and political instability.  
While there are an increasing number of sophisticated forecasts of social failure that do 
not take varying policies into account, the real usefulness of forecasting is the evaluation 
of how various political instruments are able to address the challenge of social tipping 
points. The next generation of forecasting models will undoubtedly also need to address 
how varying policy choices are able to reach their goals ex ante. This presupposes, how-
ever, a willingness in the policy circles to use such evaluation instruments. 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to offer a conceptual foundation for explaining 
and predicting social tipping points considering three social science methods for the 
analysis of crucial bargaining situations, and second, to propose a formal model rooted in 
rational choice theory for explaining and predicting social tipping points. With social tip-
ping points we mean constellations where the social fabric of a country breaks apart and 
where a country embarks on a course of dramatic, but not always violent political change. 
Usually, complex systems are assumed to respond to gradual change in a smooth way. 
However, most of them also have critical thresholds – “tipping points” – “at which the 
system shifts abruptly from one state to another” (Scheffer et al. 2009, 53). This definition 
matches a standard dictionary definition of a tipping point, where the concept represents a 
constellation “at which a series of small changes or incidents becomes significant enough 
to cause a larger, more important change.”1  
The concept of tipping points has played an important role in the social and natural sci-
ences since Grodzins (1958) coined the term and Schelling (1971, 1972) formalized it. 
The 1971 article by Schelling was cited in the Web of Knowledge until December 2010 by 
500 articles from a wide variety of disciplines, ranging from economics to mathematical 
physics to environmental affairs. Beyond the often metaphorical usage of the term “tip-
ping point”, however, there is relatively little systematic research that conceptualizes the 
societal conditions under which a society suddenly moves from one predominant behav-
ioural pattern to another one or, to put it into the parlance of game theory, from one equi-
librium to the next one. 
Radical change is present in almost all social and biological systems. Global financial 
markets for example encounter sudden systemic market crashes like the “Black Friday” 
event in 1929 or the 2008 global financial crisis which fundamentally altered the interac-
tions among economic agents for years to come and which, at least in the former case, also 
heralded catastrophic developments in the political sphere. In ecosystems radical change 
can manifest itself for instance in the rapid loss of transparency and vegetation observed in 
shallow lakes, in the swift overgrowth of fleshy brown algae in Caribbean reefs, or, at a 
slower pace, in the irreversible desertification processes in the Sahara region. On the eve 
of such events, complex systems might lose their resilience to deal with external and in-
ternal shocks and the capacity to maintain their original states (Scheffer et al. 2001, 592–
593).  
Like economic and ecological systems that experience sudden shifts, social systems can 
also encounter tipping points. The explanation and prediction of social tipping points en-
joys a rich tradition in the social sciences. The field of research encompasses the study of 
social revolutions and regime changes, examinations of how economic or environmental 
shocks affect the risk of violent conflict as well as analyses of what was called “state fail-
ure” and is now more conventionally termed “state fragility” or “state instability”. In this 
study, we survey the literature on how the social order in fragile societies breaks down, 
and what factors key contributions to this field believe to be responsible for such radical 
changes. To this end, we review and discuss the literature that tries to explain and predict 
                                                 
1  See online: http://english.oxforddictionaries.com/search?q_0=tipping%20point&f_0=full_text (accessed 
10 December, 2010). 
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such social tipping points. We therefore restrict the analysis to a review of recent attempts 
to scientifically predict breakdowns in the political and social order and some of its most 
extreme manifestations, including crashes of economic and financial institutions, authori-
tarian and democratic regime change, internal war, domestic terrorism and genocide. We 
differentiate between endogenous and exogenous tipping processes and contend that at-
tempts to forecast radical change have to be aware of several problems prediction faces in 
the natural and social sciences. We discuss some of these problems and discuss which 
forecasting approach will be appropriate for which sort of tipping process. Our categoriza-
tion attempts are discussed in light of recent attempts in the social sciences to forecast 
instability and conflict (e. g. Beck / King / Zeng 2000; Rost / Schneider / Kleibl 2009; 
Ward / Greenhill / Bakke 2010) which have led to several attempts to assess the predictive 
accuracy of competing models (e. g. Thomson et al. 2006; Schneider / Finke / Bailer 
2010a; O’Brien 2010). 
1.1 The concept of “tipping points” in the natural sciences 
Each of us is used to dealing with at least one method of more or less accurate prediction 
in everyday life: the weather forecast. Meteorologists have improved their tools for fore-
casting in the last decades significantly (Malberg 2002). They perform weather predictions 
routinely every day and for varying time horizons. Over the past few years, the time span 
for these forecasts has been extended considerably and the geographic differentiation has 
increased. Weather forecasts contain valuable information for farmers interested in effec-
tive agricultural production, but they also alert the public to extreme weather events like 
typhoons, hurricanes, and heavy rain or snowfall. The search for the conditions under 
which such dramatic events unfold is paralleled by the attempts to understand and predict 
long-term climate change.  
In the current discourse on the increasingly fragile earth climate, the tipping point concept 
has gained a particularly prominent role. In a popular notion, it describes the moment in 
time when human activities have such large-scale impact on components of the earth sys-
tem that these components pass into qualitatively different modes of operation what in 
turn has large-scale impact on human and ecological systems. Typical examples in the 
public debate are the dieback of the Amazon rainforest or the decay of the Greenland ice 
sheet.  
In a systematic way, Lenton et al. focus on subsystems of the earth system and define the 
tipping point as the “critical point ... at which the future state of the [at least subcontinen-
tal] system is qualitatively altered [by small perturbations]” (2008, 1786). Lenton et al. 
include nonclimatic variables for explaining and predicting tipping points, namely human 
activity to cause large-scale changes and public awareness of such changes (2008, 1787). 
Furthermore, they are aware of slower cases of transition where one tipping point may not 
be obvious but the change will have nevertheless a critical impact on the system in the 
future; and they leave open whether the transition is reversible or irreversible.  
In an interdisciplinary endeavour, natural and social scientists from various disciplines 
refer to “tipping points” as strongly non-linear, extreme responses by components in the 
climate system (WBGU 2008). Unlike Lenton et al. (2008), the WBGU experts perceive 
these substantial changes as most often of a qualitative nature, suggesting that such 
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changes increase the risk that the system irreversibly crosses a critical threshold by trig-
gering runaway changes that are very difficult to bring under control again (WBGU 2008, 
72). They also cite the Greenland ice sheet, which could potentially start to slide and disin-
tegrate if warming exceeds a critical threshold, and the Amazon rainforest, which could 
irrevocably die back if a critical point of global warming is crossed (WBGU 2008, 73). In 
other words, the tipping processes, which the world climate has reached or is about to 
reach, invoke radical change that has far-reaching consequences for human life and socie-
ties. The WBGU analysts suppose that for example the collapse of the Amazon rainforest 
could fundamentally alter agricultural production in Latin America, incurring incalculable 
economic costs and triggering large-scale migration (WBGU 2008, 72–75). Such extreme 
changes can, as some fear, even cause violent conflict and war (Burke et al. 2009, but see 
also Buhaug 2010).  
The tipping points identified by these recent advances in climate change research are, in 
other words, associated with large-scale and complex risks of social, economic and politi-
cal nature that affect not only single countries, but due to spill-over effects entire regions 
of the world.  
1.2 Value of the concept for the social sciences 
As shown above, the tipping point concept has been employed in recent years mainly in 
the natural sciences to identify the possibility of abrupt changes in earth systems and to 
develop early warning mechanisms that provide timely warnings for such sudden shifts, 
although it has its origins in the social sciences. The re-introduction of the concept to so-
cial scientific research raises several questions that this study tries to answer. A first chal-
lenge that we address is whether tipping point models can be fruitfully used in attempts to 
avert catastrophic social crises. This question is linked to a second query of whether or not 
the social sciences provide adequate theories and predictive tools for the identification of 
the critical moments when fragile social conditions risk breaking down. Third, we will 
examine the relevance of the tipping point concept for development cooperation, empha-
sising how approaches to studying tipping points can inform early warning initiatives. In 
other words, this study is designed to present an analysis of how social and political “tip-
ping points” can be studied and how methods for analysing tipping points can be applied 
in a development planning context to anticipate moments of rapid destabilisation in fragile 
states.  
Accurate predictions of the risk of political and social tipping can enable the development 
community to use mediation and conflict prevention and management instruments more 
efficiently, given that information is effectively processed and transferred into preventive 
action.2 Adequate moderating behaviour based on careful scientific forecasts may even 
prevent the escalation of violence to a protracted civil war or to massive forms of one-
sided violence such as genocides. For example, the well-timed deployment of the NATO 
                                                 
2  We are fully aware of the problems related to information processing and decision-making that may 
render it difficult to transfer information about impending crises into preventive action. Even when there 
is a robust evidence base using appropriate methods to diagnose social tipping points, politicians may 
shy away from adequate preventive action, and the results of social science forecasting remain unused. 
However, the flaws of political decision-making and action-taking are beyond the scope of this study. 
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mission “Essential Harvest” with approximately 3500 troops to the Former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia (FYRM) in August 2001 with the mandate to disarm ethnic Albanian 
groups and destroy their weapons combined with the parallel diplomatic missions of the 
UN, NATO and the EU and negotiations between the conflict parties prevented a civil war 
between the various parties in the territory according to regional experts. A cease-fire was 
respected that guaranteed the integrity of the FYRM as a state and its transition to a stable 
democracy (Lund 2005; Gromes 2009; OECD 2009, 50). 
In many cases, however, due to competing political, diplomatic, or economic reasons or 
due to the lack of political will, for example, international intervention comes too late or is 
so weak that it cannot prevent the unfolding disaster. Such failures often lead to ex-post 
facto expressions of consternation that a traumatizing event could have been prevented as 
it was allegedly easily predictable. Feil for instance mentions that the informational basis 
would have been sufficient to predict even horrendous developments like the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994: “… a modern force of 5,000 troops, drawn primarily from one country 
and sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and 21, 1994, could have significantly al-
tered the outcome of the conflict” (Feil 1998, 3).  
The case of Macedonia demonstrates the value of robust prediction followed by an ade-
quate international reaction: with a relatively small military mission sent in time, the dev-
astating consequences of a war could be avoided and the potential costs of long-term mili-
tary engagement and humanitarian assistance that would have been necessary if the civil 
war had broken out could be limited considerably. The Rwandan case, in our view, illus-
trates the opposite: the absence of an adequate international reaction led to a devastating 
escalation of violence although the risk of genocide in this country had loomed large for 
several years. Systematic research is, in other words, valuable for further advancing social 
science models, theories, and approaches for the sake of robust predictions on various time 
scales forecasting the potential collapse of societies and states. Predictions based on social 
scientific research will deepen our understanding of conflict escalation and its conse-
quences for the survival or breakdown of political systems, thereby allowing the develop-
ment of adequate tools for preventive behaviour and moderation of conflicts. 
But is it possible to predict extreme social events? The recent publication of the best-
selling “The Black Swan: The Impact of The Highly Improbable” by Nassim N. Taleb 
(2007) has reanimated the old debate on whether prediction is useful (Schneider / 
Finke / Bailer 2010a; Schneider / Gleditsch / Carey 2011 for references). Especially sea-
changing events like the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989/90 or the 2011 upheavals in the 
Arab world have fostered the view that prediction is difficult and the scientific forecasting 
of rare, disruptive events close to impossible (see also Lobe 2011 for such a premature 
interpretation).3 According to Taleb, all important events in history, economy, and politics 
appear without warning. After-the-fact genealogy (as opposed to forecasting) only gives 
the impression that it explains anything; even worse, such ex-post facto explanations tend 
to oversimplify complex events. In essence, Taleb argues that nobody precisely antici-
pated the advent of the most recent revolutionary events because they are so unusual and 
therefore escape in Taleb’s view any notion of predictability.  
                                                 
3  Note that concerns over the possibility to forecast extreme events are also present in disciplines such as 
seismology (e. g. Hough 2010). But in these other disciplines we almost never encounter the opinion 
that such prediction exercises are completely impossible. 
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We disagree with this pessimistic assessment. Although prediction is no panacea and fore-
casting particularly disruptive events is a considerable challenge, the social sciences have 
developed a plethora of approaches that can be used for the precise prediction of social 
developments. The wide range of approaches might seem bewildering for some. It is, in 
our view, however, easily possible to sort out scientific from non-scientific forecasts by 
applying standard measures of forecasting accuracy as the ones discussed in O’Brien 
(2010).  
In the social sciences and elsewhere, forecasting boils down to the evaluation of different 
scenarios that one can obtain from running competing models. Such model evaluations 
have to address the same objective, but differ in the general forecasting approach or with 
regard to the number of explanatory factors. Thomson et al. (2006) and Schneider / 
Finke / Bailer (2010a) employ various game-theoretic models to assess their forecasting 
accuracy across a wide set of decision-making cases in EU legislation. O’Brien (2010) 
presents the results from recent attempts by the US military to develop an Integrated Crisis 
Early Warning System (ICEWS). Within this program, several top academic forecasters 
were asked to predict the risk of various correlates of internal instability. Based on these 
results, O’Brien contends that agent-based simulation models are often an appropriate tool 
to forecast conflict.4  
The general academic goal of any prediction is the identification of the model that offers 
the most accurate forecast in comparison to the real outcome. Politicians and civil ser-
vants, by contrast, are mainly interested in real-time forecasts and thus predictions of an 
event or a trend that is truly unknown. This creates occasional tensions between the fore-
casters and the practitioners which Wildavsky (1979), using a long-standing Quaker aspi-
ration, summarised in the title to his “Speaking Truth to Power” monograph. These ten-
sions can only be abated if academics ultimately accept that prediction belongs as much to 
their routine work as explanations; politicians and civil servants should learn that they can 
only anticipate an outcome of a political process (and possibly counteract it) if the early-
warning mechanism on which the forecast relies is scientifically successful.  
1.3 Forecasting “True Positives” and “True Negatives” 
The general goal of scientific prediction is to have as many accurate forecasts as possible. 
If the event to be predicted is binary as it is in the case of the occurrence of state break-
down or non-occurrence of this event, we can distinguish “True Positives” and “True 
Negatives” as the ideal type accurate predictions. A “True Positive”, also sometimes la-
belled “hit”, is a correctly predicted event, while the “True Negative” is the correctly pre-
dicted non-occurrence of the event of interest. A prediction failure occurs if the forecast-
ing model provides false alarms. These false alarms can be either Type I (prediction of an 
“event” that in reality did not occur) or Type II errors (prediction that an event would not 
occur although it occurred). Type 1 errors are also called “False Positives” and Type 2 
errors “False Negatives”.  
                                                 
4  Agent based modeling studies how social systems evolve based on the interactions of artificial players 
(“agents”). 
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Several indicators have been introduced to assess the success of a particular forecasting 
model and to compare competing models systematically. Success here equals model accu-
racy, recall and precision, meaning how closely the values predicted by the model match 
with the values observed. The list of criteria to determine model accuracy ranges from the 
number of point predictions over the mean square error (the residual sum of squares, di-
vided by the number of degrees of freedom) to Theil’s (1966) measure of forecasting ac-
curacy, which represents the sum of squared differences between the prediction and the 
outcome divided by squared deviations of the observed values from a naive prediction. 
This standard criterion is especially useful in the context of time series predictions (Blie-
mel 1973). If we can establish clear point predictions, we can also use the criteria dis-
cussed by O’Brien (2002, 2010). We would, however, like to add before doing this that no 
statistic is, in our view, preferable in all applications. According to Achen (2006), models 
delivering a low mean square error are not unavoidably the ones providing the largest 
number of correct point predictions.  
If we can as indicated above make a binary decision between the occurrence and the non-
occurrence of an event, we can establish the accuracy, the recall and the precision of a 
forecasting model to sort out good approaches from bad ones. The accuracy of a forecast 
is the number of correct predictions (“True Positives and “True Negatives”) divided by the 
number of predictions made (sum of all Positives and all Negatives) of a particular model. 
“Recall” measures the number of “True Positives” divided by the number of events that 
have occurred, and “Precision” assesses the number of “True Positives” divided by the 
number of events of interest that were predicted to occur.  
All these criteria are used for the assessment of the ex-post and the ex-ante accuracy of a 
forecast. Policy makers are, as outlined above, mainly interested in the latter type of pre-
dictions, which are also called “real life forecasts” and thus anticipations of events that 
have not yet happened. Such “ex-ante” or “out-of-sample” predictions are also of particu-
lar interest to researchers as these forecasts prevent that a particular model is only good in 
identifying cases within the sample of cases under consideration. In other words, real life 
forecasts help to detect whether a forecasting model is driven by the idiosyncrasies of a 
particular dataset or not.  
A minimal expectation for the accuracy of a model predicting a binary event is that it pre-
dicts at least 50 % of all cases correctly and hence that it is at least as good as pure chance. 
This benchmark is easily achieved if the event of interest is rare and if a model delivers a 
lot of “True Negative” forecasts. However, the 50 %-benchmark is not sufficient, as a 
model also needs to deliver “True Positives”. Note that quite some prominent contribu-
tions have so far failed in delivering this sort of forecast. This is for instance the case for 
some models of the so-called democratic peace, the Kantian peace approach, which fail to 
predict any “True Positive” (Ward / Siverson / Cao 2007). Hence, these explanatory mod-
els were only able to predict the occurrence of peace between democratic and non-
democratic pairs of states, but simultaneously failed to forecast the occurrence of conflict. 
In other words, standard theoretical model are unable in this setting to identify “True Posi-
tives”, but do well in predicting “True Negatives”. In the case of state fragility, the fore-
casting ability of prominent models looks a bit better (Goldstone et al. 2010). Applications 
of prominent contributions to the civil war literature deliver better forecasts as they are 
also able to forecast events that have really occurred (e. g. Rost / Schneider / Kleibl 2009; 
Ward / Greenhill / Bakke 2010). However, two theoretical models that have received 
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widespread attention – the state capacity approach by Fearon / Laitin (2003) and the po-
litical economy explanation favoured by Collier / Hoeffler (2004) – do not perform well in 
the cross-validation exercise pioneered by Ward / Greenhill / Bakke (2010).5  
The limited usefulness of influential models in predicting specific dimensions of state fra-
gility alerts us to the necessity to carefully assess the theoretical basis of a model. The 
predictions do not necessarily need to make much sense theoretically. What ultimately 
matters is the accuracy of the forecast. Nevertheless, a convincing theory helps us to dis-
criminate between theoretically based and atheoretical prediction models of similar accu-
racy, recall and prediction. The reliance on atheoretical models is particularly dangerous 
for an attempt to predict change. If we for instance rely on a simple rule to anticipate fu-
ture events like “tomorrow’s weather will be like today’s weather”, we will end up with 
forecasts that in no situation included the prediction of a change. A naïve forecasting 
model can for instance try to forecast state failure based on the assessment of whether or 
not a country has experienced this fate before. Such a forecasting model might “explain” 
the variance of state experiences in the statistical sense. As it is not based on a solid theo-
retical mechanism, however, it fails in identifying the moments when a fragile country 
would tip from relative stability to the widespread usage of political violence. 
1.4 Selection of approaches for predicting social tipping points 
In contrast to Taleb (2007), we therefore contend that predicting social tipping points is 
not necessarily more difficult than forecasting radical environmental change. And we 
claim that social science research is able to identify the causal chains that lead to disrup-
tions – a necessary requisite for discovering patterns, trends and discontinuities, and ulti-
mately for forecasting “social tipping points”. 
The literature on the prediction of social change has made rapid progress in recent years. 
We will differentiate between structural, dynamic and game theoretic approaches to the 
prediction of social and political outcomes. The study will present, based on a thorough 
review of the available literature, the key findings from political science and sociology 
and discuss which of the three approaches is useful in which context. We will also high-
light the data problem that renders the task of predicting social change quite difficult. Be-
cause much relevant information is, if anything, only available at a high level of temporal 
aggregation like the year or the quarter year, we need to find proxy information to predict 
sudden changes. A further problem that we identify and discuss is the problem that tipping 
points are often equated with dramatic changes. However, such extreme events are rare 
and therefore not easy to predict, not least because most indicators that are used to predict 
less dramatic changes are also only slowly varying over time, not heralding at all the pos-
sibility that social behaviour might “tip over” to some other social equilibrium in the near 
                                                 
5  The state capacity model predicts that weak states in which the government cannot credibly deter rebels 
fall victim to civil war. The original contribution by Fearon / Laitin (2003) operationalized state capacity 
through economic development as expressed through the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and 
the percentage of a country´s terrain that is mountainous. The original “greed” model by Collier / Hoeff-
ler (2004) maintained that countries rich in natural resources face a higher risk of civil war. These au-
thors have qualified their contributions in subsequent publications (e. g. Collier / Hoeffler / Rohner 
2009). 
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future. We will conclude our study with a discussion of how sudden social stress can be 
managed over time. 
1.5 Study outline 
To sum up, this study answers the following questions:  
• What are social tipping points? 
• Where and how do social tipping points emerge? 
• How can social tipping points be predicted? 
• How can the study of tipping points contribute to early warning in development pol-
icy? 
In section 2 we will define “social tipping points” and present the key characteristics of 
“fragile” states where social tipping points typically occur. On this basis we propose our 
theoretical understanding of a social tipping point situation. In section 3 we will discuss 
the strengths and weaknesses of three theoretical approaches for the prediction of social 
tipping points and consider thereby three important problems to be solved for accurate 
tipping point prediction. Section 4 offers insights in how the analysis of social tipping 
points informs planning of development policies and how it fits into early warning initia-
tives. A concluding section 5 rounds up the analysis and gives hints to further avenues of 
research. 
2  Definition of key concepts and introduction of a theoretical model  
2.1 Social tipping points 
Following Scheffer et al. (2009, 53), we define tipping points as “a sudden shift to a con-
trasting dynamical regime”. Social shifts that are investigated by political scientists and 
sociologists deal with shifts at the state or society level and include for example the transi-
tion from peace to war, from autocracy to democracy, from a stable state to a collapsed 
state or from an integrated to a segregated society. We call this kind of tipping point a so-
cial tipping point. In contrast to natural scientists (Scheffer et al. 2001, 592–593), we do 
not assume that the outcomes of social tipping points are irreversible. On the contrary, 
violent conflicts may collapse back upon themselves, quickly democratized regimes may 
fall back into authoritarian rule, collapsed states may regain former strength and capacity, 
and segregated societies may find way back into societal integration and inclusion. Fur-
thermore, we do not necessarily presume that social tipping points have to be solely nega-
tive for a society. Without doubt, the consequences of civil war or genocide are dreadful 
because thousands of innocents are physically and mentally harmed and entire communi-
ties are traumatized. But a social tipping point can also represent the chance for an over-
due political reorganisation of a state. There are for instance many post-communist states 
which have narrowly escaped the danger of state failure and have embraced political and 
economic freedom. These and similar transitions have also opened new windows of op-
portunity for the population. But to make a new start and to make constructively use of a 
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social tipping point, all tipping point situations require ex post substantial societal adap-
tion in social, cultural, political or economic terms.  
A difficult point to define is the time dimension of a “sudden” social shift. Some spells of 
abrupt change, like for example the collapse of the Communist Czechoslovak regime in 
November 1989 or the outbreak of the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994, have indeed 
occurred within a matter of hours. But in almost all cases, such shifts are the result of a 
longer term change in the social, political and economic order of a country resulting in the 
destabilization and (near) failure of the regime. Such shifts manifest themselves for exam-
ple in the emergence of an economic crisis, a legitimacy crisis, or a performance crisis as 
in the case of Czechoslovakia and of a political power crisis in combination with a social 
exclusion crisis as in the Rwandan case. In such an unstable situation, one extreme event 
can trigger a “sudden” shift: in the Czechoslovak case it was the breakdown of the 
neighbouring Communist regimes that triggered the transition to democracy, and in the 
Rwandan case it was the murder of the Rwandan president that triggered the genocide. But 
to make it more explicit, none of the triggering events could have caused a social tipping 
point alone. Both here mentioned events were the result of longer-term developments in 
the economic, political and social fabric of the two states. Thus, social science research 
needs to identify these longer term processes as well as the relevant structural and behav-
ioural patterns that contribute to the destabilization of a country and the sudden tipping 
over of the relevant processes to new modes of interaction.  
2.2 Fragile statehood 
Researchers in transition studies consent that a stable and functioning state is a requisite 
for the peaceful living together of individuals (Linz / Stepan 1996, 28–33). However, there 
is a long and intensive debate of what a state is and what the state has to deliver to call it 
“stable” and “functioning” (for an overview see Merkel et al. 2003, 230 and Schneckener 
2005). We seek to avoid a normative impregnation of the concept and thus follow the 
pragmatic approach of Fabra Mata / Ziaja (2009, 5) by characterizing a state according to 
the following three attributes: effectiveness for how well state functions are performed, 
authority understood as the enforcement of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and 
legitimacy as the public, non-coercive acceptance of the state. “State capacity” is thereby 
at best classified on a continuum of all three attributes: the more a state provides goods 
and services to its citizens (effectiveness), the more it is able to enforce a legitimate mo-
nopoly on the use of force (authority) and the more it allows for political rights and civil 
liberties and is accepted by its people (legitimacy), the more stable and functioning it is. 
Vice versa, a fragile state is not as capable as expected by its citizens in fulfilling its re-
sponsibility as a provider of the monopoly of the use of force, of a functioning political 
order, and of basic services and public goods, which in turn undermines its legitimacy. 
According to the different stages on the stability-fragility continuum, fragile states can be 
classified as either “failing” or “failed”. “Failing states” perform necessary state functions 
just partially, while “failed states” have already ceased to perform the envisaged functions 
(Chesterman / Ignatieff / Thakur 2005; Ignatieff 2004; Rotberg 2004). Two aspects remain 
to be noted: First, the concrete threshold of when a state can indeed be called “fragile” 
varies over the different state fragility indices used in social science (for an overview see 
footnote 7). And second, the notion of a “failing state” is open to the direction of further 
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development of state capacity; that means the state can either continue to complete state 
failure or it can regain strength and develop its capacity towards a more stable state.  
For a long time now proponents of globalization and transnationalization have hypo-
thesized the end of the state, or, at least, have postulated its limited capacity to govern in a 
globalized world (Baskin 2003; Ottaway 2003; Risse 2005, 2007). Nevertheless, the state 
remains still the most important model of social organisation (Kritz 1996); and there is 
hardly any legitimate and equally capable and fair institutional alternative to a functioning 
state (Krasner 1999).6 That is why the development community is particularly concerned 
with the spread of fragile statehood in the developing world.  
Fragile statehood is particularly challenging because fragile states tend to become a risk 
for stability and security at three levels: at the level of their own population, of their re-
gional neighbours and of the international community. At the local level the population is 
threatened by the limited capacity of the state to control and perform the legitimate use of 
force and to take and implement decisions. The absence of the rule of law endangers the 
physical security of human beings, and especially weak actors and actors in a minority 
position remain without protection. The state may tolerate or even support the use of force 
against its citizens (Batt / Lynch 2004, 6–7; Gurr / Marshall / Khosla 2001). At a regional 
level neighbours may be destabilized by negative spill-over effects, for example through 
migration and refugee flows, and the spread of organized crime. Finally, at the global level 
failing and failed states can become safe havens for terror networks and extremist groups. 
Fragile states are hardly able to limit organized crime activities like the smuggling of 
drugs, illegal weapons and human trafficking; to the contrary, mostly leading actors profit 
from weak statehood and have hardly any interest in re-strengthening state capacity 
(Batt / Lynch 2004, 6–7). In these states, clientelistic networks, family clans, tribe struc-
tures, warlords or terror groups take the place of functioning state organs. They selectively 
provide security for some parts of the society and insecurity for others while taking exclu-
sionary decisions and extracting resources and distributing them to their followers. Arbi-
trariness, corruption, and ad hoc decision-making replaces the rule of law (Schneckener 
2005, 7). In such contexts, the belongingness to the political community is equally ques-
tioned and can in turn trigger (violent) conflict. Accordingly, in our view, the structural 
context of a fragile state particularly prepares the ground for social tipping points.  
There is a widespread consensus about the list of countries that fall into the “fragile state”-
category.7 However, social scientists are still at loggerheads over the causes of this fragil-
ity. The empirical search is accompanied by a discussion of whether such terms are useful 
at all and whether or not their usage masks certain ideological or material paradigms of the 
                                                 
6  Alternative forms of governance or „governance without government“ shall not completely be denied 
here (see interesting considerations in Kötter 2007; Risse 2007; Schuppert 2008); however, in our view, 
alternative concepts will remain limited to partial governance functions.  
7  Fabra Mata / Ziaja (2009) identify 11 indices that focus on measuring fragility at the country level, pro-
vide numerical scores on for at least 75 states and are thus potentially suited for cross-country compari-
sons. Among the most prominent index providers, the World Bank (2009) delivers an index for „Low-
Income Countries Under Stress“ (LICUS); the Fund for Peace (2010) proposes the „Fragile States In-
dex“; and the OECD (2010, 145) provides a list of fragile states encompassing low-, middle- and high-
income countries in its annual report „Resource flows to fragile and conflict-affected states“ using three 
fragility indices in combination, namely the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the 
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy. 
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industrial world or the development community. Be that as it may, we contend that it is of 
utmost importance to explain and predict the process of when a state or society embarks 
onto a social tipping point.  
Unfortunately, the literature on fragile states does not provide us with a definitive list of 
factors that would help us to forecast which countries are at a particular risk of becoming 
“failures”. In his masterful treatise “When Things Fall Apart”, Bates (2008, 20) maintains 
for instance that the possibility of political order depends on three factors, namely the 
level of political revenues, the rewards from predation, and the rate of discount that the 
actors who possess the possibility to use violence attach to a relatively cooperative course 
of action. In his view, many African states have endured various forms of state failure that 
resulted from economic shocks and the subsequent erosion of public revenues. In such a 
crisis, it becomes more and more attractive to use force to maintain or gain access to alter-
native income sources, most notably rents accruing from the exploitation of natural re-
sources. Goldstone et al. (2010), by contrast, maintain in a macro-quantitative evaluation 
that partial democracies with factionalism and armed conflict in neighbouring states are 
key drivers of two forms of instability, civil war onsets and adverse regime change. This 
lack of consensus on the necessary and sufficient conditions of social tipping points is the 
reason why we develop an encompassing theoretical model based on rational choice think-
ing in the next section. 
2.3 Our theoretical model of a social tipping point situation 
One of the key problems in the social and natural sciences is the prediction of extreme 
events where a society suddenly moves from one equilibrium to another one. Quite often, 
researchers rely on Schelling’s (1971, 1972, 1978,147–155) tipping model or extensions 
thereof, which is also known as the “segregation model” (Ruoff / Schneider 2006), to ac-
count for such radical changes. In this innovative contribution, Schelling showed how so-
cial segregation in urban areas becomes the outcome even if neighbours only have a mild 
preference to be among their own and would tolerate to live in a multicultural society to 
some extent. According to Schelling’s model, it only takes a marginal increase in the 
number of residents with a particular ethnic background to provoke the flight of other 
groups from this neighbourhood. 
In an early influential social scientific model of tipping processes, Granovetter (1978) 
considers how a group beset by collective action problems is able to overcome this chal-
lenge and to change the social rules by tipping over a threshold. We model such behaviour 
below as a social interaction between competing social groups where one side profits from 
the status quo whereas the other ones suffer under it. Our graphical identification of ideal 
typical tipping point processes refers to two groups. The analysis can be translated without 
any loss of generalizations to multilateral interactions.  
Our models are based on the supposition that most cases of state fragility are based on 
some sort of distributional conflict in which they bone of contention can be territory or 
access to public goods. The assumption that tipping processes can be traced to socio-
economic cleavages is gaining ground in the fragility literature (Bates 2008). It also fills a 
certain void in the research on civil unrest which has for a long time neglected to pay suf-
ficient attention to inequalities between groups and the resulting distributional conflicts. 
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Income polarization between groups has theoretically discovered to be very dangerous 
when two equally strong groups oppose each other, one of them richer, one of them poorer 
(Esteban / Ray 1999, Esteban / Schneider 2008). Østby (2008) shows in an empirical ap-
plication of this polarization thesis that extreme horizontal inequality crucially affects the 
risk of social turmoil.  
We assume in line with this emerging literature that the resulting social tipping processes 
largely result from economic discrimination which often goes hand in hand with political 
discrimination. Obviously, it is also imaginable that social turmoil results from the latter 
form of inequality alone. Such a political model of tipping processes, however, begs the 
question why the privileged group engage in discrimination against an excluded group at 
all. In other words, if we do not want to study inequalities by simply noting that they are 
present, we need to motivate their occurrence theoretically. We believe that economic fac-
tors like the ones studied below are crucial in this respect and that our assumption that 
many social tipping processes have socio-economic roots is well justified.  
To understand the eruptive nature of the resulting distributional conflicts, we differentiate 
between endogenous and exogenous tipping point processes and assume for simplicity that 
a country finds itself in a situation where the groups co-exist with each other based on an 
unfair social contract benefitting group A at the expense of group B. Of course, such a 
contract and its implementation can be based on a peaceful agreement, but can also result 
from the threat or usage of oppression. This status quo outcome, which is for reasons of 
simplification situated on the contract curve (i.e. the set of socially optimal outcomes), is 
denoted as cij, while the fair outcome fij, which is equally located on the Pareto frontier, 
represents a division of the welfare of a society that both sides would consider to be fair 
given their strength and productivity. Both groups are considered to be equally strong in 
terms of group size. In Figure 1A, the tipping process starts out with a negative exogenous 
shock to a society, while in Figure 1B the shock is positive. A negative shock leads to a 
shift of the contract curve towards the origin; a positive one moves the set of feasible out-
comes in the opposite direction. Both groups can invest in unproductive conflict activities. 
The social loss Lij that results from these rentseeking activities is maximized if the groups 
are equally strong (Esteban / Ray 1999, 2008).  
A negative shock which moves the contract curve to the origin can result from a sudden 
change in the economic or political change that a society has to endure and which cannot 
be met with automatic stabilizers. Dramatic negative shocks are the involvement or endur-
ance of major crises and violent conflict in neighbouring states. Note that the shift of the 
contract curve does not mean that the dominant party A is able to defend necessarily the 
privileged position. Even if the costs of the shock are equally paid by the two groups, it is 
not guaranteed that the underprivileged side does not want to challenge the current profi-
teers. It is indeed the case that reduced possibilities render conflict more likely as the op-
portunity costs of fighting are reduced. However, fighting is also less attractive as there 
are fewer means to be conquered through force (Fearon 2008). There is nevertheless quite 
some evidence that poorer countries have more difficulties in dealing with exogenous 
shocks, increasing the risk that such societies embark onto a course of self-destruction. 
Note that such negative shocks can also be of a temporary nature and for instance follow 
from policy shifts such as foreign economic liberalization (Bussmann / Schneider 2007). It 
is also important to note that the experience of a shock does not automatically translate 
into a tipping process. The groups have to make choices and to invest in conflict if they 
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believe that moving away from the transformed social contract is in their interest. Hence, 
not all negative shocks in the form of earthquakes or other natural disasters translate into a 
civil war, although there is increased risk that a country goes through such a social escala-
tion after such a devastating experience (e. g. Nel / Righarts 2008). 
Figure 1B depicts an almost analogous process in which a society suddenly faces a posi-
tive economic shock. This can happen as a consequence of the discovery of natural re-
sources. The anticipated rents create an incentive to regnegotiate the social contract or, if 
this fails, to start using force. Note that actors will invest more in conflict in such a situa-
tion as the expected gains from conflict have grown. This indicates that the risk of state 
failure can grow in the wake of positive growth shocks, as some proponents of the re-
source curse thesis maintain despite the conflicting evidence (Brunnschweiler 2008; 
Brunnschweiler / Buthe 2008). 
Obviously, a society does not only reach the nadir where cooperation tips over into anar-
chy through outside forces it cannot control. On the contrary, the intellectually most chal-
lenging situations are probably endogenous societal changes like unequal economic pro-
ductivity which increase the imbalance between the contending social groups and which 
render the fragile social contract more and more unsustainable. Indeed, the risk of social 
eruptions has frequently been equated with youth bulges which are particularly dangerous 
if they affect contending social groups very differently (Urdal 2008). Endogenous tipping 
refers to processes within a society that lead to a challenge to the often unjust social con-
tract. Such a constellation is depicted in Figure 1C in which through an unequal develop-
ment between the groups the “fair” division of the spoils move from f1C to f2C. Note that 
the social loss due to investment in political violence becomes according to Esteban / Ray 
(1999) larger the more polarized a society is. In Figure 1C, the different size of L1C and 
L2C represent this divergence. 
In reality, tipping processes most often contain endogenous as well as exogenous triggers. 
Such a synthesis of the processes is represented in Figure 1D where a society, in which 
one group grows at the expense of the other one and is therefore increasingly able to chal-
lenge the unfair status quo, falls victim to an external shock. It is most likely that such a 
country is at a high risk of anarchy as the redistributive conflicts grow in line with the in-
creasing awareness that the social contract is untenable. Brancati mentions the cases of 
Colombia in 1999 and El Salvador in 1986 to illustrate that “earthquakes have not only 
failed to foster peace but have seemed to spur intrastate violence as well” (2007, 716). 
What this last model suggests is that a combination of exogenous and endogenous forces 
increases the risk of social breakdown. This means for the study of state failure and insta-
bility that additive regression models that disregard the likely impact of this interaction 
most likely underestimate the risk for many states. This is especially true in times of a 
global economic crisis in which the distributional conflicts intensify. It is not surprising in 
this light that many historians have attributed an increasing polarization of the societies in 
the wake of major economic downturns (Esteban / Schneider 2008).  
The conjecture that social tipping processes are very often driven by the interaction of 
exogenous and endogenous forces does not necessarily mean that the individual processes 
contributing to state fragility are non-linear. Indeed, the models that are used in the natural 
sciences to predict the tipping over from one state into a qualitatively very different equi-
Sonja Grimm / Gerald Schneider 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 16 
librium are often highly deterministic. In the social processes studied here, there is quite 
often an element of chance which forbids the researcher from adopting the methodologies 
developed in the natural sciences to predict social behaviour; social actors can make 
choices whether or not to adopt a certain course of action, while this sort of discretion 
does not exist in processes where individual humans play a negligible role. Although we 
do not detail the social processes contributing to state failure here, the competition be-
tween contending groups on whether or not the weaker or disadvantaged side should be 
compensated and how such a deal could be implemented is crucial for the analysis of state 
fragility. Analytically, the inclusion of a chance element in attempts to predict social tip-
ping processes does not render these studies more complicated than the equivalent fore-
casting examinations undertaken in the natural sciences. It simply means that the forecasts 
do not result from a deterministic but rather from a probabilistic model.   
 
 
In the following, we will discuss whether the social sciences are able to deal with the dou-
ble challenge of forecasting endogenous and exogenous tipping processes. Our central 
argument boils down to the contention that the different approaches in predicting social 
tipping points serve different purposes. The consequence of these diverse goals is that the 
Figure 1: A visualization of four ideal type social tipping point models 
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ideal type research designs outlined below have a differing capacity to meet the problems 
of predicting the social and political breakdown of states. While longitudinal approaches 
which typically involve panel data on a number of countries might be adequate for the 
study of endogenous tipping processes, the competing approaches outlined below might 
be more fruitful for the analysis of exogenously determined processes. 
3 Approaches for predicting tipping points  
The social science literature on forecasting dramatic events like state failure, genocide or 
war falls into three main categories: structural, dynamic and game theoretic approaches 
(see also Schneider / Gleditsch / Carey 2011). We will introduce these competing methods 
in the following and argue that they complement each other and that they all have special 
merits and weaknesses. 
Our review of the literature indicates that no forecasting technique or model is superior in 
all contexts. However, we suggest in the following which approach might be adequate in a 
particular attempt to forecast social tipping points. In our view, the key problems of fore-
casting political events are threefold. First, prediction crucially depends on the reliability 
of the information used for the forecast. This means that a prediction is only as good as the 
data that the researcher feeds into the empirical model (information problem).8 Second, 
configurations in which a society risks embarking on a disastrous course are seldom. This 
rarity renders the prediction of sea-changing events more challenging than the forecasting 
of routine developments (rare event problem). Third, many tipping events are highly ex-
treme and therefore of a magnitude that applications of a standard model cannot capture or 
that is beyond conventional theorizing attempts (extremeness problem).  
Table 1 shows how the three approaches differ with regard to these challenges. A positive 
sign indicates that the approach is able to deal with this challenge, a negative sign that the 
problem is often insurmountable. We provide a detailed assessment below. 
                                                 
8  This often leads observers to complain that a particular disaster could have been prevented because the 
relevant information was allegedly present at the critical juncture. This sort of ex post facto counterfac-
tual was made, as mentioned by Feil (1998, 3), with regard to Rwandan genocide in 1994.  
Table 1: Comparing the applicability of the three prediction approaches 
 Information  
problem 
Rare event 
problem 
Extremeness 
problem 
Applicability 
Structural  
approach 
– + + Risk assessment 
for many cases  
Dynamic  
approach 
+ + – Predictions for 
many periods 
within one case 
Game theoretic 
approach 
+ – + Single-shot predic-
tions for one case 
at a time 
Note: “+” indicates that the approach can deal with the problem; “–”indicates that the approach cannot 
deal with the problem. 
Source: own compilation 
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3.1 Structural approaches 
Structural approaches try to predict the risk of a geographical unit (whether a country, a 
region, or a town) experiencing a certain behaviour in subsequent time periods given im-
portant structural characteristics of the unit at present. The structural approach has been 
used for the analysis of interstate conflict (e. g. Choucri / Robinson 1978), refugee move-
ments (e. g. Schmeidl / Jenkins 1998a), complex humanitarian emergencies (Harff / Gurr 
1998; see also Schmeidl / Jenkins 1998b), genocides and politicides (Fein 1992; Harff 
1998, 2003; see also Harff / Gurr 1998), ethnic conflict (Gurr / Moore 1997; Gurr 1998, 
Moore / Gurr 1998; Gurr / Woodward / Marshall 2005; see also Tellis / Szayna / Winne-
feld 1997), state failure (e. g. Goldstone et al. 2000; Goldstone et al. 2010; King / Zeng 
2001; Carment 2003), general political instability (e. g. O’Brien 2002), civil conflict 
(Weidmann / Ward 2010), and human rights violations (Poe / Rost / Carey 2006).  
Researchers who rely on the structural approach typically rely on cross-sectional data; this 
design allows the researcher to predict the risk that a country or region will fall victim to a 
civil war, a human emergency or state failure, or will experience one or several terrorist 
events. The variables that are used in this context are the structural attributes of a country 
like for instance its level of democracy, economic development or ethnic fragmentation. 
To include dynamic aspects in their estimations, researchers frequently combine cross-
sectional data at various points in time. The advantage of this pooling effort is an in-
creased ability to predict outcomes precisely. In the resulting, often very large data sets, 
the country-year or dyad-year are typical units of analysis. The traditional models have 
mainly taken into account how the country-specific attributes and the dynamics in which 
these features change affect the risk of a certain outcome. The underlying logic of the sta-
tistical models is typically additive and assumes that a unit change in one explanatory fac-
tor leads to a change in the examined risk that is the same across all countries with the 
same manifestations on the independent variables.  
These underlying assumptions are questionable in several respects. First, it is questionable 
whether the underlying factors follow an additive logic in their influence on the outcome 
of interest. Second, the traditional approach does not take into account that the units of 
observations are not only temporally interdependent on each other, but also spatially. This 
means that a state failure in country A increases the risk that states that are closely con-
nected to this country also risk to experience a breakdown. It is in the light of these ques-
tionable assumptions not surprising that the structural approach has recently seen the im-
port of classification techniques such as neural network algorithms from computer science 
and other disciplines (Beck / King / Zeng 2000; Rost / Schneider / Kleibl 2009). Such ap-
proaches allow the researcher in particular to move beyond the additive logic of standard 
econometric tools and to take non-linear relationships within the data into account. Also, 
the usage of cutting-edge econometric tools that consider the spatial interdependencies of 
the units of observations leads to forecasts that are sensitive to geographical consideration 
or the importance of social networks (Ward / Gleditsch, 2002 and related contributions). 
The article by Rost / Schneider / Kleibl (2009) serves as an illustration of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the structural approach. The authors have contrasted logit regression 
models with neural network models and provide ex ante forecasts of the risk of civil war 
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for the years 2008 to 2012.9 The authors contend that with a relatively simple model and 
with the help of publicly available data sources meaningful civil war risk assessments can 
be computed. It should, however, be noted that only one country, Nigeria, is predicted by 
both methods to belong to the five countries with the highest risk of a civil war. The longi-
tudinal logit model also includes the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Thailand, and Pakistan among the countries with the highest risk. The neural 
network model, in addition to Nigeria, classifies Eritrea, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cambo-
dia as being among the most dangerous places with regard the risk of civil war. In the so-
cial science context, forecasts have up to now mainly been made with regard to the fore-
casting of wars (e. g. Beck / King / Zeng 2000, Rost / Schneider / Kleibl 2009), but obvi-
ously the same techniques could be employed to predict other attributes of extreme forms 
of social instability. 
The diversity in the two rankings indicates that generating risk assessment models with the 
help of the structural model partly depends on the methodology. Further problems of the 
approach are the high level of temporal and spatial aggregation. This is especially a limita-
tion in the light of the slowly changing nature of most covariates. When fragile societies 
tip over from a precarious peace to intensive violence, some sort of sudden change most 
likely is at least partly responsible for these transitions. While the structural approach is 
able to identify some of the attributes of increasing risks, dynamic models of social change 
are more promising in dealing with the escalation processes that precede the breakdown of 
societies and the unleashing of unprecedented violence.  
In the absence of sound micro-level information, structural forecasts often resort to publi-
cally available macro-level information. This is, however, often problematic insofar as 
these indicators do not vary much over time. It therefore does not come as a surprise that 
predictions of politically shaped processes that resort to such limitedly useful data are of-
ten rather shaky. Attempts like the best-selling “Limits to Growth” by Meadows et al. 
(1972) to forecast the long range fate of the globe, which were very popular in the 1970s 
and 1980s, are one illustrative example of the difficulties in delivering accurate predic-
tions based on macro-level data. The failure of these models is not only related to the data 
that are used. A further problem is, of course, the extended time horizon that has largely 
neglected the possibility that policy innovations, technological progress or the discovery 
of oil reserves would offset the Malthusian doomsday logic of the original forecasts. 
However, highly aggregated data can be useful in attempts to predict certain outcomes in 
the medium term; this means a time range of one up to five years. This is the area where 
the structural approach seems particularly relevant; this approach helps to make risk as-
sessments and to limit the more detailed analysis to those political units which particularly 
face the risk of undergoing a critical juncture. Such analyses can also be conducted at 
lower levels of geographical aggregation as the innovative forecasting exercise by Rustad 
et al. (2011) demonstrates. They break new ground in using the structural approach to pre-
dict conflict through an innovative combination of national- and regional-level data. The 
                                                 
9  Logit models enable the researcher to predict the risk of a binary outcome given specific attributes. In 
the forecasting studies discussed here, neural network models serve the same purpose. They stand, how-
ever, more generally for a research tradition in computer science. Neural network algorithms have been 
developed as a classification tool that involves for instance learning algorithms and thus elements that 
are not included in logit regression predictions.  
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examples of Nepal and the Philippines highlight provinces that are expected to be particu-
larly conflict-prone. The country-level approach that has prevailed in studies on civil un-
rest until recently misses addressing such intra-country differences in assessing the risk of 
state failure.  
The structural approach nevertheless faces severe challenges even when the time horizon 
of the forecasts includes lower-level information and is limited to the short term. First, the 
information which is necessary for generating the forecasts might be unreliable or missing. 
This dual problem is particularly relevant for forecasting exercises where one tries to pre-
dict events or trends that are largely dependent on the level of development of a country as 
input information. Hence, complete and accurately assembled statistics often do not exist 
for those countries in which public institutions have failed to an extent that violence seems 
imminent. Second, some structural indicators are inadequate for forecasting short-term 
events or trends if they are aggregated at a higher level. For instance, if an analyst wants to 
assess the risk of conflict next week based on the observation of escalatory tendencies this 
week, even using indicators disaggregated monthly does not make sense. 
3.2 Dynamic approaches 
Like structural approaches, dynamic approaches equally try to predict the risk of a geo-
graphical unit experiencing certain behaviour in subsequent time periods with regard to 
certain key structural characteristics of the unit at present. In contrast to structural ap-
proaches however, scholars frequently resort to time-series designs. As they use shorter 
time intervals in these applications, some of the problems of the structural approach are 
circumvented. There are for instance numerous attempts to predict the further evolution of 
political violence within a particular conflict area like Kosovo (Pevehouse / Goldstein 
1999) or the Levant (Schrodt / Gerner, 2000; Brandt / Freemann / Schrodt 2011; Schneider 
2012). As outlined below, it is of particular interest to the development community to pre-
dict conflict dynamics for countries that it considers to be at a particular risk of experienc-
ing high levels of fragility. The main problem here is, however, a structural one as only 
scientifically sound global analyses help to sort out the countries which are at a high risk 
of undergoing such a detrimental periods and those where the equivalent risk is relatively 
low. 
For the study of particular conflicts the use of so-called event data is one of the most fre-
quently used types of information. Event data like for instance the Kansas Event Data Sys-
tem (KEDS) rely on computerized content analysis of newspaper reports to categorize 
cooperative and conflictive events that occur between a sender and a target actor (see 
Goldstein 1992 for the coding scheme and Pevehouse / Goldstein 1999 as well as Schrodt / 
Gerner 2000 for KEDS applications). One can create levels of cooperation or conflict be-
tween these dyads at many levels of temporal aggregation, ranging from the daily 
(Schneider / Troeger 2006) to the quarterly or yearly level of interaction. Event data has 
also been used as a handy early warning device. This is particularly true for the now de-
funct “FAST International” project of the Swiss Peace Foundation, which was used by 
Austrian, Canadian, Swedish and Swiss policy making circles to improve their early warn-
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ing and preventive action capacities as well as to refine their development programmes 
towards conflict-prone countries.10  
One of the key advantages of this approach is, as indicated, the usage of temporally disag-
gregated data. As some conflicts also receive quite some media attention, it is technically 
quite straightforward to use Google News or similar services as input for an up-to-date 
early warning tool. The data gathering becomes, however, much more involved if the me-
dia reports are sparse or biased. The FAST project relied on country experts for the data 
input. This approach faces the similar difficulty as everything depends then on the trust-
worthiness of the reports that these experts send to the forecaster. 
To illustrate the pros and cons of this approach, we briefly summarize the state-of-the art 
contribution by Brandt / Freeman / Schrodt (2011). Their forecasting tool, which over-
comes some of the limitations of the structural model, in particular the usage of highly 
aggregated information or incomplete data sets, is tested through event data-based fore-
casts for the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians for 2010. One of the key innova-
tions is the incorporation by Brandt / Freeman / Schrodt (2011) of expert judgement in the 
form of Bayesian prior probability assessments of their research assessments; these as-
sumed probabilities are based on existing theoretical and empirical work on conflict dy-
namics. To produce the forecasts, the authors employ two advanced times series ap-
proaches that follow the logic of Bayesian inference: Bayesian vector autoregression 
(BVAR) and Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregression (MS-BVAR) models.11 
These models allow the inclusion of what possibly comes close to a tipping process, 
namely phase shifts in the behaviour of the conflict actors. Using the automated coding 
software TABARI, Brandt / Freeman / Schrodt (2011) provide weekly forecasts for the 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in real-time. 
The main advantage of single conflict time-series designs is the possibility to model the 
dynamics within a particular conflict more precisely. However, this advantage comes at 
the price of reduced external validity, as the conflict trajectories do not necessarily resem-
ble each other across different conflicts. The limited usefulness of macro-quantitative po-
litical data for predictive purposes is the reason why forecasters of political events fre-
quently pursue different research strategies. Time-series forecasts often include input in-
formation that is disaggregated to the quarter year, the month, the week, or even the day 
(Schneider 2012). As official statistics often only provide figures at the monthly or quar-
terly level, predictions at lower levels of temporal aggregation often refer to events data. 
Structural models also often make “timeless” forecasts, for example by predicting an in-
creased risk of civil war outbreak for a particular country without specifying within what 
time frame this outbreak is expected to take place.  
                                                 
10 For detailed information on the FAST International programme please refer to http://www. 
swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/index.html (accessed 10 December, 2010). 
11  The Bayesian approach in statistics generally uses prior knowledge to estimate the likelihood that a 
hypothesis can be accepted or needs to be rejected. The approach is based on the Bayes’ theorem in 
probability calculation and involves the usage of this algorithm in the calculation process. Vector auto-
regression is an econometric approach that aims to study the relationships between various time series. 
Markov-switching models allow additionally for the study of series where time series shift from one 
level to another one.  
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Judgmental information that is employed to produce predictions does not only take the 
form of expert views that are directly gathered for the predictive purpose. Indirect expert 
information can come from prediction markets (Arrow et al. 2008; Wolfers / Zitzewitz 
2004) or similar sources like financial markets where a group of independent individuals 
evaluates a policy that is relevant for economic actors and that can only be ignored at great 
costs (Schneider 2012). The former information source unites investors who trade con-
tracts yielding payoffs related to an uncertain outcome like an election result or the risk 
that an escalation process results in war. Prediction markets typically predict political out-
comes better than polls (e. g. Berg et al. 2008; Schaffer / Schneider 2005). This is not par-
ticularly surprising as the traders are able to include these polls like any other piece of 
information in their evaluation of how the political market will evolve and because the 
respondents in a poll are usually not compensated for their willingness to face a polling 
firm. It is therefore much more astonishing that financial markets can be used as a tool to 
forecast political events. Schneider (2012) shows that data from the Tel Aviv Stock Ex-
change can be used to forecast political cooperation in the Levant. Judgmental information 
of this sort cannot, however, be used very successfully to predict conflict events. This di-
vergence results from the element of surprise that characterizes many types of conflict, not 
the least its violent forms. Cooperative acts like the signing of a ceasefire, conversely, are 
often announced before the actual event takes place. 
We contend that the surprising nature of many conflictual events often render them more 
likely candidates for the expertise of individual experts who might be much more familiar 
with a particular conflict and its escalation potential than the masses or even a group of 
scholars with high general competence. A further reason to resort to individual experts for 
the prediction of particularly dramatic events is that such occurrences might constitute a 
structural break in a particular political process or that their magnitude is so exceptional 
that the covariates used for the production of longitudinal or time-series forecasts cannot 
capture them.  
3.3 Game theoretic approaches 
The third and final approach that is useful for the prediction of tipping point conditions in 
fragile states is game-theoretic. Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors (e. g., Bueno de 
Mesquita / Newmann / Rabushka 1985; Bueno de Mesquita 2011; see also Bueno de Mes-
quita 2002, 2009 for summaries) have pioneered the application of game theory to predic-
tion. These studies typically rely on detailed information from area experts as the empiri-
cal basis; these experts do not predict an outcome of a policy making process, but only 
provide information on what a conflict is about (“issues”), the positions of the actors on 
them and how much importance they attribute to a bone of contention. The forecaster then 
uses these data in strategic models to estimate where the decision making process will end 
and what policy position is finally chosen. 
The approach is, as indicated before, particularly well-suited for the development of com-
parative model evaluations and has been used to explain and predict patterns of decision 
making in the European Union (Bueno de Mesquita 2011; Thomson et al. 2006; Schnei-
der / Finke / Bailer 2010a) and elsewhere (Bueno de Mesquita 2002, 2009). The applica-
tions by Schneider / Finke / Bailer (2010a) and Thomson et al. (2006) can serve as an il-
lustration. These authors evaluate for over 60 decision making processes in the European 
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Union which decision making model has the highest predictive accuracy. They show that 
bargaining models are particularly useful for predicting political decision making proc-
esses.12 The most accurate model is a version of the Nash Bargaining Solution that takes 
the importance attributed to an issue into account. We believe that such models hold some 
promise for the analysis of social tipping processes. The most dramatic policy changes in 
fragile states were almost always preceded by implicit or explicit negotiations between the 
conflict parties as the rich literature on conflict as a bargaining process starting with Nobel 
awardee Thomas Schelling (1960) demonstrates (see for example Ruoff / Schneider 2006; 
Bailer / Schneider 2006). 
Some proponents of this approach contend that these models produce very high levels of 
predictive accuracy (see e. g. Feder 1995, 2002). Yet, the approach has a limited ability to 
forecast how a process unfolds over time (for a partial exception see Bueno de Mesquita 
2011) and does not provide uncertainty measures for the predicted outcome (Brandt / 
Freeman / Schrodt 2011).  
This leads to the third challenge that attempts to forecast international events have to mas-
ter – the possibility of dramatic, or in other words extreme, developments. Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita’s (2011) forecasting approach seems to be able to circumvent this problem. 
Within this model-based framework, the opinion of the expert is only used as an input for 
a forecasting tool that has its foundations in decision and game theory. The main advan-
tage of this forecasting approach is that the level of expertise that is required from an in-
terview partner only relates to evaluating the present. Hence, game-theoretic models that 
are used to produce forecasts rely on the estimates that the interviewed expert provides 
with regard to the actors’ preferences and power and the importance they attach to various 
contested issues. Bueno de Mesquita applies the new model informally presented in his 
bestseller The Predictioneer’s Game (2009) to a dataset that a multi-national research 
team had assembled for the evaluation of competing game-theoretic models on the legisla-
tive process in the European Union (Thomson et al. 2006). The new model developed by 
Bueno de Mesquita adds additional complexity to the original framework devised in 
Bueno de Mesquita / Newman / Rabushka (1985) and later refined in numerous applica-
tions. Of particular importance is that this new game-theoretic model allows predicting the 
behaviour of multiple agents who move simultaneously to reach their goals and who in-
clude estimates of the other actors’ behaviour and beliefs when they make their choices. 
The Bayesian updating used in these games offers a fascinating parallel to the time series 
models presented in Brandt / Freeman / Schrodt (2011). Empirically, the new forecasting 
models of Bueno de Mesquita performs better than the models presented in Thomson et al. 
(2006), but slightly worse than one of the adaptations of the Nash Bargaining Solutions 
introduced by Schneider / Finke / Bailer (2010a). To the authors’ knowledge, the approach 
has not been applied to fragile states. There is, however, no reason why game-theoretic 
forecasting models should not work in such a context if one can assess the preferences and 
power of central actors within a given context.  
                                                 
12  These are all out-of-sample predictions as the expert interviews took place before the conclusion of the 
decision making processes. Information on the outcome of the decision making were gathered through 
follow-up interviews. 
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3.4 Comparison of the three approaches: strengths and weaknesses 
None of these approaches provides better applications in all contexts. Instead, we believe 
that while the structural approach is often the only one available for forecasting at the 
global scale, the rational choice framework is particularly useful for the prediction of sin-
gle events, which can be of a routine or dramatic nature. This comparative advantage 
looms particularly large in contexts where only a few experts are able to provide reliable 
empirical input for the models. Experts are not necessarily more qualified than the unin-
formed public to forecast the future (Tetlock 2005). In fact, Bosler / Schneider (2011) 
demonstrate in an empirical analysis that financial markets and thus the decisions made by 
traders whose main expertise is not on the political side are often better in forecasting the 
success of ceasefires in the Levant in comparison to the editorial writers of the New York 
Times or the Jerusalem Post. However, if experts are solely used to provide information 
on the issues at stake and the positions of the relevant actors, as it is the case with the 
Bueno de Mesquita forecasting tradition, they can be successfully used (see also Tetlock 
2009). If relevant information is available publicly and non-dramatic events have to be 
forecasted, the time-series method might be more useful, particularly with access to tem-
porarily more fine-grained data.  
We nevertheless advocate that development agencies pay clear attention to the different 
approaches and consider their advantages and disadvantages carefully. Most early warning 
schemes that they use have relied on the structural approach as Niño Pérez (2004) discus-
sion of the EU Commission’s “Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict/Early Warning 
Indicators” reveals. We believe that this is dangerous as this approach is only able to pro-
vide relatively slowly changing information and does not include data on the social escala-
tions processes that characterize a society on the brink of social turmoil.  
4  The use of the tipping point concept in development policy  
4.1 Applicability of the “tipping point” concept in development policy 
We stated in the beginning of this study that social tipping points especially occur in frag-
ile states. These fragile states are important recipients of foreign aid. According to the 
OECD INCAF statistics (OECD 2010, 50), USD 34.6 billion in Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) went to fragile states in 2008. That amounted to 31 % of total ODA 
(excluding debt relief). To avoid a waste of resources aid donors necessarily need to an-
ticipate social tipping points because they need to assess the risk in investing in fragile 
contexts. A certain level of risk in investment may by tolerable, however, one can assume 
that in a (near) tipping point situation foreign aid will hardly be invested effectively; and 
during and shortly after a social tipping point already invested ODA mostly deflagrates 
without ushering in the intended effects of stability, economic growth and human devel-
opment (for an overview see OECD 2010). Furthermore, tax payers’ money should be 
invested carefully.  
Numerous studies have shown that preventive political action is less costly than reactive 
political action, not only in financial terms but also in terms of human lives (Brown / 
Rosecrane 1999). Obviously, nobody wants a second Rwanda or Srebrenica, both symbols 
for the complete failure of the international community to see conflicts coming and to act 
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adequately in these crises situations. Thus, also for moral reasons an accurate prediction of 
tipping points is required. Finally, as Zartman (2001, 153) calls it, there is “such a thing as 
‘too late’ ” in a conflict situation, namely when the moment for preventive diplomacy has 
passed and when it becomes hardly impossible to gain entry into a whole phase of a con-
flict from the outside. In such a situation, no other means remains for the international 
community than the very costly use of force or to the bearing of the long-term costs of 
non-action. Doing nothing increases the chance that states which have endured the stress 
of a political and social breakdown will collapse again. The protracted state weakness 
shown in cases such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti, the anarchy that manifests in con-
temporary Somalia, and the protracted civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
among others, demonstrate that inaction creates considerable long term costs. Thus, it 
seems to be much better not to miss the moment for an active preventive policy.  
However, transferring social science expertise into effective political action is not an easy 
task. As a first step, the accurate anticipation of social tipping points requires well-crafted 
early warning schemes that deliver independent fine grained risk assessments based on 
comprehensive data that is analysed with advanced social science techniques. Such an 
early warning unit should possess a list of criteria to discover the signals that announce the 
occurrence of social tipping points. As a second step, such analyses need to become the 
bases of political decision-making and policy implementation. Studies need to be read, 
and experts need to be heard. As a third step, politicians have to deploy the necessary 
means to moderate the escalation of conflict. The toolbox ranges from diplomatic conflict 
moderation tools up to military intervention, but they can only be used effectively if the 
causes of conflict are well assessed and the positions and capabilities of the key actors 
well-known. Finally, for long term prevention of negative social tipping points, interna-
tional actors equally need to address the root causes of conflict.  
None of these challenges is easily overcome, as the next section will show. 
4.2 Challenges of early warning  
As argued above, to prevent negative social tipping points in fragile states effective early 
warning units are a necessity. Early warning initiatives have played a prominent role in 
development research at least for the last twenty years (see OECD 2009 for an overview). 
Especially the period immediately after the genocide in Rwanda saw the establishment of 
several early warning initiatives, including the establishment of the Forum on Early Warn-
ing and Early Response (FEWER), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP), the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning (EAWARN), 
and the Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions (FAST), an initiative of Swisspeace 
(OECD 2009, 34–35, 50).13 
A first problem with these initiatives is, however, that they often die out after the first en-
thusiasm. Reasons for this might be unrealistic expectations, changes in the internal 
agenda of the supporting development organisation, or scarce financial resources with 
whom it is hardly possible to fund a large network of experts in a long term horizon. An 
                                                 
13  FEWER and FAST have both closed down by 2009. 
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illustration of this is the globally acting FAST International program of Swisspeace. Based 
on local knowledge networks, including the expertise of country desk officers, country 
experts, and fact-finding missions, FAST collected relevant information on conflictive 
situations, analysed the data with advanced social science methods and formulated feasi-
ble policy options for decision-makers with the intention to guide them to early action. 
FAST used a comprehensive methodology that combined the advantages of both qualita-
tive and quantitative analyses of conflictive and cooperative trends in the societies under 
observation. In a 10-year time span from 1998 to 2008 the FAST experts observed devel-
oping conflict situations of countries in Africa (Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
Congo/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia), Asia 
(Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan), and Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kos-
ovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russian Federation/North Caucasus, and Serbia). FAST 
International was utilized by a range of international development agencies, including the 
Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Although of great value to pro-
vide accurate information and to draw the international community’s attention to trouble 
spots, due to financial restrictions the project was finished in 2008.14  
A second problem of early warning is the difficulty to get all information necessary to 
predict social tipping points. Fabra Mata / Ziaja (2009) elucidate these problems with re-
gard to the creation of state fragility indices. Their evaluations show that especially fragile 
states are characterized by „social mistrust, hidden dynamics and agendas, regime secrecy 
and lack of infrastructure and capacity seriously [that] hamper any attempt to gather reli-
able and representative information“ (Fabra Mata / Ziaja 2009, 16). This context does not 
only affect the validity and reliability of information, but also the coverage for possible 
explanatory variables. The problem of missing data for certain indicators or time periods, 
especially in the past, renders forecasting difficult. Furthermore, a time lag of one or two 
years in data publication is particularly problematic for the measurement of quickly 
changing phenomena. Thus, early warning initiatives require conducting intensive data 
coding, expert surveys and opinion polls by themselves to get access to essential informa-
tion. Such endeavours are costly, and this may further discourage development agencies to 
invest in early warning systems. 
A third problem of early warning initiatives is that their analyses are seldom unbiased and 
neutral, or in other words, most of policy-oriented early warning initiatives follow an indi-
vidual and thereby necessarily partial policy agenda. The International Crisis Group 
(ICG), working on early warning for 15 years now with an annual budget of approxi-
mately US$ 15 million (ICG 2010, 47) sets a prominent example. After the closure of 
FAST and also of FEWER, the ICG is the only remaining early warning initiative that is 
acting globally. According to their mission statement, the ICG is “an independent, non-
profit, non-governmental organisation committed to preventing and resolving deadly con-
flict”.15 Its publication record is impressive, providing easily accessible and understand-
able information about around 60 crisis countries around the world. However, all their 
                                                 
14  See footnote 6. 
15  See for further information http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about.aspx (accessed 10 December, 2010). 
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analyses come with a strong element of policy advocacy both in “moral, legal, financial 
and political” terms (ICG 2010, 5). Furthermore, critics find fault in the ICG’s reports and 
briefings with a lack of consistent theoretical or conceptual frameworks, a certain kind of 
selectivity in interviewing only high ranking politicians in the countries under watch, in 
picking up information from biased local sources, in a tendency to use one-sided language, 
and in a lack of indication of sources supporting their arguments with empirical evi-
dence.16 Thus, a stable financial basis and a large network of high ranking former politi-
cians and diplomats are no guarantee for balanced crisis assessments and unbiased rec-
ommendations for preventive action. 
A fourth problem is to transform early warning assessments into adequate political action. 
While political and military short-hand instruments in crisis situations must be quickly 
deployable, at any time, and to any part of the world, there is also a need for long term and 
comprehensive strategies to address the structural root causes of conflict. The analysis of 
the conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms of the European Union reveal the 
challenges that need to be solved in order to make a conflict prevention strategy effective 
(Kronenberger / Wouters 2004, 574–582). Firstly, to raise coordination and coherence, but 
to avoid double work and lack of information, short term and long term strategies need to 
be matched. Secondly, to invest scarce resources effectively, responsibility and account-
ability for budget spending needs to be clarified. Thirdly, to enhance rapid reaction capac-
ity, all instruments of conflict prevention and moderation need to be useable at short no-
tice and staff members need to be trained accordingly. Fourthly, to avoid duplication of 
work and loss of resource at the international level and thereby in the end also loss of 
credibility of all actors involved, organisations need to agree on a framework of division 
of labour. In the case of the European Union this concerns foremost the Council of 
Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO 
who all are involved in conflict prevention in Europe, but also beyond. To all these chal-
lenging questions answers need to be found to avoid that they turn into shortcomings 
which could aggravate even further the near tipping point situations in fragile states.  
Finally, the problem of assessing the effectiveness of early warning and the political ac-
tion based on it remains. Early warning initiatives share the evaluation problem with the 
measurement of the effectiveness of development cooperation and democracy promotion 
(for an overview on challenges and methods see Faust / Neubert 2010). The evaluation of 
the effectiveness of early warning is further exacerbated by the fact that their benefits are 
usually unnoticed. In the best case, a near tipping point situation like strong ethnic ten-
sions does not develop into a tipping point, in our example the outbreak of an ethnic civil 
war that would have devastating consequences for the members of the affected society. As 
the Macedonian case that was mentioned above showed, it is a mixture of external and 
internal factors that contribute to conflict prevention. Thus, external early warning and the 
political action by external actors that is based on it can hardly alone prevent social tipping 
                                                 
16  See for critical statements on the ICG in general: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27a/201.html 
(accessed 10 December, 2010) and: http://newleftreview.org/?view=2841 (accessed 10 December, 
2010); and on critical analyses of their reports in particular http://www.sangam.org/taraki/  
articles/2006/12-12_IGC_Report.php?uid=2114 (accessed 10 December, 2010) and: http://www2.  
reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/YSAR-6XRLPX?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=mmr (accessed 10 
December, 2010). 
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points. Nevertheless, early warning can and has to raise public awareness about near social 
tipping point situations that urgently need intervention and conflict moderation. 
4.3 Conditions for successful early warning  
In essence, to be a successful tool for preventing social tipping points, early warning ini-
tiatives should include the following activities:  
• the systematic collection of event data and expert assessments of crisis regions to al-
low systematic crisis forecasts;  
• the analysis of the data based on advanced qualitative and quantitative social science 
techniques using the strength of both approaches;  
• the development of strategic response scenarios to these crises and the assessment of 
their intended and unintended consequences; and  
• the unbiased, impartial, and independent presentation of policy and implementation 
options to decision-makers, knowledge disseminators, and conflict moderators. 
Early warning initiatives need to be neutral and fair in their assessments, include local 
expertise, hire experts from all over the world that are well trained in conflict assessing 
methods and techniques, and be independently funded on a long term basis. And they 
should have a strong link to responders or response mechanisms. 
  
5 Conclusions and recommendations 
Scientific predictions are a necessary first step if we attempt to counteract dangerous so-
cial escalations or tipping processes. Counter-measures may come too late or in an inade-
quate size. In some areas like climate change or nuclear war, scientists provide timely 
warnings on a regular basis. The “doomsday clock” of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists which is supposed to indicate “how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction”, is 
a telling illustration.17 The considerable risk for some states to fall victim to massive inter-
nal destruction is not matched with a similar international early warning mechanism.  
5.1 Main findings 
We have argued in this study that the international community should provide permanent 
early warning for the countries that face a considerable risk of internal breakdown. Al-
though some initiatives exist, the early warning system needs to be global in scope, politi-
cally unbiased and scientifically sound. Obviously, early warning is no panacea. It may 
lead to the wrong policy prescriptions if based on the wrong theoretical or methodological 
foundations (Ward / Greenhill / Bakke 2010).  
                                                 
17  See http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/overview (accessed 10 December, 2010). 
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The choice of a particular prediction technique depends on the expected nature of the an-
ticipated trend or event and on the quality of data that a researcher intends to feed into the 
model. In our view, the structural approach is able to provide relatively rough predictions 
of the risk that might beset a certain country or a certain region in the future. The predic-
tion of which countries might fall victim to war, for instance, is similar to the seismologi-
cal attempt to assess which regions of the world face what sort of risk of experiencing an 
earthquake. By contrast, the time-series design does not allow such sweeping compari-
sons, but strives to provide accurate assessment for one particular process only. The point 
predictions allow an assessment of how large the magnitude of a particular event might be. 
Temporarily finely disaggregated data, available on the Internet or from financial or bet-
ting markets, enable forecasting of a single process. However, not all relevant information 
is publically available, and we may want to predict structural changes. Hence, in some 
instances we may need to resort to the rational choice forecasting model, which allows the 
researcher to forecasts events that experts have assessed as political options of one or sev-
eral stakeholders in a political decision-making process.  
Although each the three approaches presented here seem to have certain advantages in a 
specific context, it should not be necessary to use them in isolation from each other. Scien-
tific progress will only be achieved if we start to run comparative model evaluations 
across different modelling traditions, including both quantitative and qualitative assess-
ments, like large-n statistical analysis in the former and like expert advice in the latter 
case. Up to now, such competitive endeavours have been confined to one particular class 
of forecasting models as O’Brien (2010) and Thomson et al. (2006) show. For instance, 
such exercises could deal with the question of when the time-series and rational choice 
approaches expect the onset of a crisis and in what magnitude. An increased level of dia-
logue between forecasters might also benefit the policy community. For example, it might 
be feasible for the academic side to provide early-warning models that combine elements 
of the ideal-type designs presented here. It seems possible to predict the risk of conflict for 
a set of actors and then employ the other designs to evaluate for the high-risk countries the 
potential that the structural crisis of the state really escalates into the use of armed vio-
lence. In other words, the field of forecasting international relations faces considerable 
academic and practical challenges that amply show how much progress has already been 
made.  
5.2 Recommendations 
More precisely, our study leads to the following recommendations: 
• International development assistance should incorporate a double approach to early 
warning. While it is mandatory to use structural forecasts on a regular basis, they need 
to be supplemented by in-depth forecasts for countries which are at a particularly high 
risk of breakdown. Note that this approach is similar to earthquake warnings. The 
structural approach is used there to identify the regions of the world with a particularly 
high structural risk. To assess the high-risks regions the dynamics of changing earth-
quake risks, seismologists resort to dynamic analysis that assesses the probability of a 
major earthquake over time. 
• The dynamic analysis of countries which are at a considerable risk needs to be sup-
plemented by careful analyses what key decision makers want, what their power is 
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and what policy options are at stake. We have suggested that such information is used 
in game theoretic models from which we can derive forecasts of what a collective of 
actor will decide. It is certainly possible that other models of social interactions will 
be used for the purpose to derive forecasts. We have, up to now, however, not seen 
such applications although they are easier to apply than more standard forecasting 
technologies which require vast amounts of often not existing statistical data. 
• Once the international development community receives the forecasts of the research 
community or its forecasting units, it needs to discuss carefully with its academic 
partner what these forecasts imply. Unfortunately, most current forecasts do not take it 
into account how varying policy prerogatives affect the risk of state failure. The entire 
prediction business is therefore conducted in complete isolation from the policy world. 
We believe that this academic isolationism, to which both sides, the academic one and 
the policy one, contribute, needs to change if we ever want to truly accept the social 
sciences as a useful collection of disciplines that is able to deal with urgent human 
problems and ways in which they can be addressed.  
• As a next step, in order to make use of its “power”, the international community 
should seek consent on processes and means for taking preventive action. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to discuss adequate conflict prevention tools. However, without 
taking early action, recommendations based on sound and systematic early warning 
analysis will clearly be without any effect.  
• All in all, we believe that it is mandatory for the development policy community to 
take the challenge of tipping points and their prediction seriously and to create a “pre-
diction culture”, through which the usage of prediction tools becomes a routine task in 
model testing. Moreover, if agencies are able to intervene in a timely fashion and to 
prevent the worst, a further humanitarian disaster might be avoided. We believe that a 
forecasting culture can only be reached if well trained social scientists are put in 
charge of early warning units and if they are in a constant dialogue with policy mak-
ers. This concerns not only developed countries where preventive action is organised, 
but also developing countries where risks of social tipping points emerge. In both 
worlds, the capacity to collect and to process data should be strengthened. Obviously, 
this is especially demanding in fragile and authoritarian states where social mistrust, a 
lack of political transparency and a lack of infrastructure hamper professional attempts 
to gather reliable and representative information. Unaddressed, the quality of sources 
will be put into question and the whole business of tipping point forecasting will be 
delegitimized.  
5.3 Avenues for further research 
Obviously, the social sciences are an ever-evolving set of academic disciplines in which 
the enthusiasm for prediction is not constant and in which the current enthusiasm about 
forecasting will experience a certain backlash. We nevertheless expect that prediction will 
become much more common and that assessments of the ex ante forecasting capacity of 
an empirical model will become a routine affair. One way forward for the prediction of 
social tipping points will be that the three approaches presented in this report will be used 
together. It is also possible to use the qualitative assessments of experts about a possible 
scenario as priors for the Bayesian analysis of the tipping point risk in dynamic and struc-
tural models. Furthermore, the relative accuracy of competing models should be assessed 
in the way that the model performances were compared in Thomson et al. (2006) and 
O’Brien (2010). As much as early warning of tipping point processes can only be im-
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proved through the constant dialogue with policy makers, as much it is necessary to con-
tinuously evaluate the underlying theoretical and empirical models. 
 

Predicting social tipping points: current research and the way forward 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 33
Bibliography 
Achen, C. (2006): Evaluating political decision making models, in: R. Thomas et al. (eds.), The European 
Union decides: the empirical relevance of policy making models, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 86–123 
Arrow, K. J. et al. (2008): The promise of prediction markets, in: Science 320 (5878), 877–878 
Bailer, S. / G. Schneider (2006): Nash or Schelling: legislative bargaining with and without domestic 
costraints, in: R. Thomas et al. (eds.), The European Union decides: the empirical relevance of policy 
making models, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 153–177 
Baskin, M. (2003): Post-conflict administration and reconstruction, in: International Affairs 79 (1), 161–170 
Bates, R. H. (2008): When things fall apart: state failure in late-century Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 
Batt, J. / D. Lynch (2004): What is a failing state, and when is it a security threat?, Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS Analysis 99) 
Beck, N. / G. King / L. Zeng (2000): Improving quantitative studies of international conflict: a conjecture, in: 
The American Political Science Review 94 (1), 21–35 
Berg, J. E. / F. D. Nelson / T. A. Rietz (2008): Prediction market accuracy in the long run, in: International 
Journal of Forecasting 24 (2), 285–298 
Bliemel, F. (1973): Theil’s forecast accuracy coefficient: a clarification, in: Journal of Marketing Research 
10 (4), 444–446 
Bosler, N. / G. Schneider (2011): The oracle or the crowd?: experts versus the stock market in forecasting 
ceasefire success in the Levant, Montréal: International Studies Association (ISA Convention Paper) 
Brancati, D. (2007): Political aftershocks: the impact of earthquakes on intrastate conflict, in: Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51 (5), 715–743 
Brandt, P. T. / J. R. Freeman / P. A. Schrodt (2011): Real time: time series forecasting of inter- and intra-
state political conflict, mimeo 
Brown, M. E. / R. N. Rosecrane (eds.) (1999): The costs of conflict: prevention and cure in the global arena, 
New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation of New York 
Brunnschweiler, C. N. (2008): Cursing the blessings?: natural resource abundance, institutions and economic 
growth, in: World Development 36 (3), 399–419 
Brunnschweiler, C. N. / E. H. Bulte (2008): Linking natural resources to slow growth and more conflict, in: 
Science 320 (5876), 616–617 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2002): Predicting politics, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press 
– (2004): Decision-making models, rigor and new puzzles, in: European Union Politics 5 (1), 125–138 
– (2009): The predictioneer’s game: using the logic of brazen self-interest to see and shape the future, New 
York, NY: Random House 
– (2011): A new model for predicting policy choices: preliminary tests, mimeo 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. / D. Newman / A. Rabushka (1985): Forecasting political events: the future of Hong 
Kong, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 
Burke, M. B. et al. (2009): Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa, in: Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science 106 (49), 20670–20674 
Buhaug, H. (2010): Climate not to blame for African civil wars, in: Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science 107 (38), 16477–16482 
Bussmann, M. / G. Schneider (2007): When globalization discontent turns violent: foreign economic liber-
alization and internal war, in: International Studies Quarterly 51 (1), 79–97 
Carment, D. (2003): Assessing state failure: implications for theory and policy, in: Third World Quarterly 
24 (3), 407–427 
Chesterman, S. / M. Ignatieff / R. C. Thakur (eds.) (2005): Making states work: state failure and the crisis of 
governance, Tokyo: United Nations University Press 
Sonja Grimm / Gerald Schneider 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 34 
Collier, P. / A. Hoeffler (2004): Greed and grievance in civil wars, in: Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4), 563–
595 
Collier, P. / A. Hoeffler / D. Rohner (2009): Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war, in: 
Oxford Economic Papers 61, 1–27 
Choucri, N. / T. W. Robinson (1978): Forecasting in international relations: theory, methods, problems, 
prospects, San Francisco, Calif.: Freeman 
Esteban, J. / D. Ray (1999): Conflict and distribution, in: Journal of Economic Theory 87 (2), 379–415 
– (2008): Polarization, fractionalization and conflict, in: Journal of Peace Research 45 (2), 163–18 
Esteban, J. / G. Schneider (2008): Polarization and conflict: theoretical and empirical issues, in: Journal of 
Peace Research 45 (2), 131–141 
Fabra Mata, J. / S. Ziaja (2009): User’s guide on measuring fragility, Bonn, Oslo: DIE, UNDP 
Faust, J. / S. Neubert (eds.) (2010): Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik: Befunde, Reformen, Instrumente, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Fearon, J. D. (2008): Economic development, insurgency, and civil war, in: E. Helpmann (ed.), Institutions 
and economic performance, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 292–328 
Fearon, J. D / D. Laitin (2003): Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, in: The American Political Science 
Review 97 (1), 75–90 
Feder, S. A. (1995): Factions and policon: new ways to analyze politics, in: H. B. Westerfield (ed.), Inside 
CIA’s private world: declassified articles from the agency’s internal journal: 1955–1992, New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 222–274 
– (2002): Forecasting for policy making in the post-cold war period, in: Annual Review of Political Science 
5, 111–125 
Feil, S. R. (1998): Preventing genocide: how the early use of force might have succeeded in Rwanda, New 
York, NY: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
Fein, H. (1992): Dangerous states and endangered people: implications of life integrity violations analysis, 
in: K. Rupesinghe / M. Kuroda (eds.), Early warning and conflict resolution, New York, NY: St. Mar-
tin’s, 40–61 
Fund for Peace (2010): Failed states index scores 2010; online: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php 
?option=com_content&task=view&id=452&Itemid=900 (accessed 10 Dec. 2010) 
Goldstein, J. (1992): A conflict-cooperation scale for WEIS events data, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 
36 (2), 369–385 
Goldstone, J. A. et al. (2000): State failure task force report: phase III findings; online: http://globalpolicy. 
gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf (accessed 11 Jan. 2011) 
– (2010): A global model for forecasting political instability, in: American Journal of Political Science 54 
(1), 190–208 
Granovetter, M. (1978): Threshold models of collective behavior, in: American Journal of Sociology 83 (6), 
1420–1443 
Grodzins, M. M. (1958): The metropolitan area as a racial problem, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press 
Gromes, T. (2009): Zwischen Zumutung und Versprechen: Die Demokratie in Makedonien, Frankfurt am 
Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK Report 8/2009) 
Gurr, T. R. (1998): A risk assessment model of ethnopolitical rebellion, in: J. L. Davies / T. R. Gurr (eds.), 
Preventive measures: building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 15–26 
Gurr, T. R. / W. H. Moore (1997): Ethnopolitical rebellion: a cross-sectional analysis of the 1980s with risk 
assessments for the 1990s, in: American Journal of Political Science 41, 1079–1103 
Gurr, T. R. / M. G. Marshall / D. Khosla (2001): Peace and conflict 2001: a global survey of armed 
conflicts, self-determination movements, and democracy, College Park, Md.: University of Maryland 
Press 
Gurr, T. R. / M. Woodward / M. G. Marshall (2005): Forecasting instability: are ethnic wars and Muslim 
countries different?; online: http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm (accessed 11 Jan. 2011) 
Predicting social tipping points: current research and the way forward 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 35
Harff, B. (1998): Early warning of humanitarian crises: sequential models and the role of accelerators, in: J. 
L. Davies / T. R. Gurr (eds.), Preventive measures: building risk assessment and crisis early warning 
systems, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 70–78 
– (2003): No lessons Llearned from the Holocaust?: assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder 
since 1955, in: The American Political Science Review 97 (1), 57–73 
Harff, B. / T. R. Gurr (1998): Systematic early warning of humanitarian emergencies, in: Journal of Peace 
Research 35 (5), 551–579 
Hough, S. (2010): Predicting the unpredictable, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
Ignatieff, M. (2004): State failure and nation-building, in: J. L. Holzgrefe / R. O. Keohane (eds.), 
Humanitarian intervention: ethical, legal, and political dilemmas, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 299–321 
King, G. / L. Zeng (2001): Improving forecasts of state failure, in: World Politics 53 (4), 623–658 
Kötter, M. (2007): Der Governance-Raum als Analysefaktor: Am Beispiel von Räumen begrenzter 
Staatlichkeit, Berlin: Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (SFB Governance Working Paper 3) 
Krasner, S. D. (1999): Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
Kritz, N. J. (1996): The rule of law in the postconflict phase: building a stable peace, in: C. A. Crocker / F. 
O. Hampson / P. R. Aall (eds.), Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international 
conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 587–606 
Kronenberger, V. / J. Wouters (eds.) (2004): The European Union and conflict prevention: policy and legal 
aspects, The Hague: Asser Press 
ICG (International Crisis Group) (2010): Report 2010: review 2009: plans for 2010; online: http://www. 
crisisgroup.org/en/about/~/media/Files/misc/Annual%20Report%202010.ashx (accessed 10 Dec. 2010) 
Lenton, T. M. et al. (2008): Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system, in: Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105 (6), 1786–1793 
Linz, J. J. / A. Stepan (1996): Stateness, nationalism, and democratization, in: J. J. Linz / A. Stepan (eds.) 
Problems of democratic transitions and consolidation, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
16–37 
Lobe, A. (2011): Die Wissenschaft vom stabilen Orient, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24 Mar. 2011; 
online:  http://www.faz.net/s/Rub5C2BFD49230B472BA96E0B2CF9FAB88C/Doc~E430DC32F39C5 
4F1AAE092E32E6C01DFA~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (accessed 28 Mar. 2011) 
Lund, M. S. (2005): Greed and grievance diverted: how Macedonia avoided civil war 1990-2001, in: P. Col-
lier / N. Sambanis (eds.), Understanding civil war: evidence and analysis: Europe, central Asia, and 
other regions, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 231–257 
Malberg, H. (2002): Meteorologie und Klimatologie: Eine Einführung, Berlin: Springer 
Meadows, D. H. et al. (1972): The limits to growth, New York, NY: Universe Books 
Merkel, W. et al. (2003): Defekte Demokratie: Theorie, Opladen: Leske + Budrich 
Moore, W. H. / T. R. Gurr (1998): Assessing risks of ethnorebellion in the year 2000: three empirical ap-
proaches, in: S. Schmeidl / H. Adelman (eds.), Early warning and early response, New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press; online: http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~whmoore/research/Moore&Gurr98.pdf 
(accessed 11 Jan. 2011) 
Nel,  P. / M. Righarts (2008): Natural disasters and the risk of violent civil conflict, in: International Studies 
Quarterly 52 (1), 159–185 
Niño Pérez, J. (2004): Conflict indicators developed by the commission: the check-list for root causes of 
conflict: early warning indicators, in: V. Kronenberger / J. Wouters (eds.), The European Union and 
conflict prevention: policy and legal aspects, The Hague: Asser Press, 3–20 
O’Brien, S. P. (2002): Anticipating the good, the bad, and the ugly, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (6), 
791–811 
– (2010): Crisis early warning and decision support: contemporary approaches and thoughts on future re-
search, in: International Studies Review 12 (1), 87–104 
Sonja Grimm / Gerald Schneider 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 36 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) (2009): Preventing violence, war, and 
state collapse: the future of conflict early warning and response; online: http://www.oecd.org/document 
/41/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42233001_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 10 Dec. 2010) 
– (2010): Resource flows to fragile and conflict-affected states 2010; online: http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
13/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_45789965_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 10 Dec. 2010) 
Ottaway, M. (2003): Promoting democracy after conflict: the difficult choices, in: International Studies 
Perspectives 4 (3), 314–322 
Østby, G. (2008): Polarization, horizontal inequalities, and violent civil conflict, in: Journal of Peace Re-
search 45 (2), 143–162 
Pevehouse, J. C. / J. S. Goldstein (1999): Serbian compliance or defiance in Kosovo?: statistical analysis and 
real-time predictions, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (4), 538–546 
Poe, S. C. / N. Rost / S. C. Carey (2006): Assessing risk and opportunity in conflict studies: a human rights 
analysis, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4), 484–507 
Risse, T. (2005): Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit, in: Internationale Politik 60 (9), 6–12 
– (2007): Regieren in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit: Zur Reisefähigkeit des Governance-Konzeptes, 
Berlin: Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (SFB Governance Working Paper 5) 
Rost, N. / G. Schneider / J. Kleibl (2009): A global risk assessment model for civil wars, in: Social Science 
Research 38 (4), 921–933 
Rotberg, R. I. (ed.) (2004): When states fail: causes and consequences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press 
Ruoff, G. / G. Schneider (2006): Segregation in the classroom: an empirical test of the Schelling Model, in: 
Rationality and Society 18 (1), 95–117 
Rustad, S. et al. (2011): All conflict is local: modeling sub-national variation in civil conflict risk, mimeo 
Schaffer, L. M. / G. Schneider (2005): Die Prognosegüte von Wahlbörsen und Meinungsumfragen zur Bun-
destagswahl 2005, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46 (4), 674–681 
Scheffer, M. et al. (2009): Early-warning signals for critical transitions, in: Nature 461 (3), 53–59 
– (2001): Catastrophic shifts in ecosystems, in: Nature 413 (6), 591–596 
Schelling, T. C. (1960) Strategy of conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
– (1971): Dynamic models of segregation, in: Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1, 143–86 
– (1972): The process of residential segregation: neighborhood tipping, in: A. Pascal (ed.), Racial discrimi-
nation in economic life, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 157–184 
– (1978): Micromotives and macrobehavior, New York, NY: Norton 
Schmeidl, S. / J. C. Jenkins (1998a): Early warning indicators of forced migration, in: J. L. Davies / T. R. 
Gurr (eds.), Preventive measures: building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems, Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 56–69 
– (1998b): The early warning of humanitarian disasters: problems in building an early warning system, in: 
International Migration Review 32 (2), 471–485 
Schneckener, U. (2005): Fragile Staatlichkeit als globales Sicherheitsrisiko, in: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 28/29, 26–31 
Schneider, G. (s. a.): Banking on the broker: forecasting conflict in the Levant with financial data, in: F. 
Wayman / P. Williamson / B. Bueno de Mesquita (eds.), Illuminating the shadow of the future: scien-
tific prediction and the human condition, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming 
Schneider, G. / V. E. Troeger (2006): War and the world economy, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (5), 
623–645 
Schneider, G. / D. Finke / S. Bailer (2010): Bargaining power in the European Union: an evaluation of com-
peting game-theoretic model, in: Political Studies 58 (1), 85–103 
Schneider, G. / N. P. Gleditsch / S. Carey (2010): Exploring the past, anticipating the future, in: Interna-
tional Studies Review 12 (1), 1–7 
– (2011): Forecasting in international relations: one quest, three approaches, mimeo 
Predicting social tipping points: current research and the way forward 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 37
Schrodt, P. A. / D. J. Gerner (2000): Using cluster analysis to derive early warning indicators for political 
change in the Middle East: 1979-1996, in The American Political Science Review 94 (4), 803–818 
Schuppert, G. F. (ed.) (2008): Governance als Prozess, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Taleb, N. N. (2007): The black swan: the impact of The highly improbable, London: Penguin Books 
Tellis, A. J. / T. S. Szayna / J. A. Winnefeld (1997): Anticipating ethnic conflict, Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand 
Tetlock, P. E. (2005): Expert political judgement, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
– (2009) Reading tarot on K Street; online: http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/reading-tarot-on-k-street-
3220?page=3 (accessed 10 Dec. 2010) 
Theil, H. (1966): Applied economic forecasting, Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally 
Thomson, R. et al. (2006): The European Union decides, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Urdal, H. (2008): Population, resources and violent conflict: a sub-national study of India: 1956-2002, in: 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (4), 590–617 
Ward, M. D. / K. S. Gleditsch (2002): Location, location, location: an MCMC approach to modeling the 
spatial context of war and peace, in: Political Analysis 10 (3), 244–260 
Ward, M. D. / R. M. Siverson / X. Cao (2007): Disputes, democracies, and dependencies: a re-examination of 
the Kantian peace, in: American Journal of Political Science 51 (3), 583–601 
Ward, M. D. / B. D. Greenhill / K. M. Bakke (2010): Perils of policy by P-Value: predicting civil conflicts, 
in: Journal of Peace Research 47 (4), 363–375 
WBGU (German Advisory Council on Global Change) (2008): Climate change as a security risk, London: 
Earthscan 
Weidmann, N. B. / M. D. Ward (2010): Predicting conflict in space and time, in: Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion 55 (6), 883–901 
Wildavsky, A. (1979): Speaking truth to power: the art and craft of policy analysis, Boston, Mass.: Little 
Brown & Co. 
Wolfers, J. / E. W. Zitzewitz (2004): Prediction markets, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 107–126 
World Bank (2009): Engaging with fragile states; online: http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/download.html 
(accessed 10 Dec. 2010) 
Zartman, I. W. (2001): Preventing deadly conflict, in: Security Dialogue 32 (2), 137–154 
 

Publications of the German Development Institute 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Messner, Dirk / Imme Scholz (eds.): Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik, 410 p., 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1005-0 
Neubert, Susanne / Waltina Scheumann / Annette van Edig, / Walter Huppert (eds.): Inte-
griertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Praxis 
überführen, 314 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1111-1 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Armutsorientierte landwirtschaftliche und ländliche Ent-
wicklung, 342 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0555-3 
Liebig, Klaus: Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissenserwerb 
in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse, 233 p., Nomos, Baden-
Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungs-
politik 1) 
Schlumberger, Oliver: Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt: Ursachen, Trends und in-
ternationale Demokratieförderung, 225 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 
978-3-8329-3114-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 2) 
Qualmann, Regine: South Africa’s Reintegration into World and Regional Markets: Trade 
Liberalization and Emerging Patterns of Specialization in the Post-Apartheid Era, 
206 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-2995-4 (Entwicklungsthe-
orie und Entwicklungspolitik 3) 
Loewe, Markus: Soziale Sicherung, informeller Sektor und das Potenzial von 
Kleinstversicherungen, 221 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2009, ISBN 978-3-8329-4017-
1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 4) 
Loewe, Markus: Soziale Sicherung in den arabischen Ländern: Determinanten, Defizite und 
Strategien für den informellen Sektor, 286 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 
978-3-8329-5586-1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 7) 
Faust, Jörg / Susanne Neubert (Hrsg.): Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik: Befunde, Reformen, 
Instrumente, 432 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 978-3-8329-5587-8 (Ent-
wicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 8) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Book Series with Routledge 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Development,   
342 p., Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Studies in Develop-
ment and Society 12) 
Krause, Matthias: The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation, 282 p., Routledge, Lon-
don 2009, ISBN 978-0-415-99489-7 (Studies in Development and Society 20) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Springer-Verlag 
Scheumann, Waltina / Susanne Neubert / Martin Kipping (eds.): Water Politics and De-
velopment Cooperation: Local Power Plays and Global Governance, 416 p., Ber-
lin 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-76706-0 
Studies 
58 Chahoud, Tatjana et al.: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Black Eco-
nomic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa: A case study of German Transna-
tional Corporations, 100 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-494-0 
57 Neubert, Susanne et al.: Agricultural Development in a Changing Climate in  
Zambia: Increasing resilience to climate change and economic shocks in crop pro-
duction, 244 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-493-3 
56 Grimm, Sven et al.: Coordinating China and DAC Development Partners: Chal-
lenges to the aid architecture in Rwanda, 200 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-
492-6 
55 Weinlich, Silke: Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nati-
onen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten ge-
genüber Reformoptionen, 121 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-491-9 
54 Ifejika Speranza, Chinwe: Resilient Adaptation to Climate Change in African Ag-
riculture, 311 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-489-6 
53 Krause, Matthias et al.: Formalisation and Business Development in Mozambique: 
How important are regulations? 131 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-490-2 
52 Voionmaa, Petra / Michael Brüntrup: German Aid for Trade: Past experience, les-
sons learnt, and the way forward, 150 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-488-9 
51 Wiemann, Jürgen et al.: Laos on its Way to WTO Membership: Challenges and 
opportunities for developing high-value agricultural exports, 186 p., Bonn 2009, 
ISBN 978-3-88985-487-2 
 [Price: 10,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.] 
Discussion Paper 
  7/2011 Garcia, Melody: Micro-Methods in Evaluating Governance Interventions, 59 p., 
Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-536-7 
  6/2011 Theesfeld, Insa et al.: Adapting Agricultural Water Governance to Climate 
Change: Experience from Germany, Spain and California, 45 p., Bonn 2011, 
ISBN 978-3-88985-535-0 
  5/2011 Ifejika Speranza, Chinwe: Promoting Gender Equqality in responses to Climate 
Change: The case of Kenya, 52 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-534-3 
  4/2011 Altenburg, Tilman: Industrial Policy in Developing Countries: Overview and 
lessons from seven country cases, 97 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-533-6 
  3/2011 Hensengerth, Oliver: Interaction of Chinese Institutions with Host Governments 
in Dam Construction: The Bui dam in Ghana, 47 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-
88985-532-9 
  2/2011 Dafe, Florence: The Potential of Pro-Market Activism as a Tool for Making 
Finance Work in Africa, 45 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-88985-531-2 
  1/2011 Erdle, Steffen: Industrial Policy in Tunisia, 63 p., Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-
88985-529-9 
20/2010 Haldenwang, Christian von / Maksym Ivanyna: Assessing the Tax Performance 
of Developing Countries, 42 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-528-2 
[Price: 6,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.] 
A complete list of publications available from DIE can be found at: 
http://www.die-gdi.de 
